01753

1975/08/22
SECRET NODIS CHEROKEE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: EGYPTIAN SIDE:

President Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat
Vice President Hosny Mobarek
Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister
Ismail Fahmy
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of War
General Abdul Ghani Gamasy

UNITED STATES SIDE:

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
Hermann Frederick Elits, Ambassador to Egypt

TIME: Friday, August 22, 1975, at 1830

PLACE: President Sadat's Guest House
Mamura, Alexandria

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

The Secretary began by giving a brief summary of his just completed visit to Jerusalem. It had been exceedingly difficult. President Sadat observed he had read of the demonstrations against the Secretary. He had been concerned about them. He recalled that we are now at a turning point and must lean toward peace.

The Secretary indicated there are two problems: a) The need to turn Israel toward peace and b) the need to turn America toward peace. The Administration had initially determined to go for an overall peace. It subsequently decided that, for a variety of reasons, the time is not yet right to do so. Hence, a new interim agreement seemed more desirable, even if limited. The Secretary noted that, unlike the January 1974 agreement, there is not a great deal that the Israelis want from Egypt. Thus, the interim agreement may be ungenerous, but will nevertheless be symbolically very important. The Israelis will for the first time be going back. Moreover, Egypt will have
economically useful territory. In Israel, once they have gotten over their hang-ups, it will also help. Israel has no strong leaders. This is why we should do our utmost to bring the negotiations to a rapid conclusion. It will be a major achievement.

The Secretary continued that he had been asked to convey President Ford's hope that President Sadat can visit the United States this year. Such a visit will contribute materially to attitudes in the United States. The President expressed agreement in principle. (Note: In a subsequent discussion with Fahmy, a possible late October or early November date was discussed.)

The Secretary then indicated he wished to make a general observation. In his view, the strategy which Sadat had begun in 1973 has been successful. Admittedly, it may have moved more slowly than we would have liked, but the reasons for this are, among others, domestic in the United States. Nevertheless, it has been a success in the sense that for the first time we can now conduct a relatively even-handed policy in the United States toward the Arabs. No other Arab leader could bring this about. For the first time since the creation of Israel, the USG took a position critical of Israel. This is a watershed in its domestic politics. If we succeed, it will mark the first Israeli withdrawal under peaceful conditions.

Now we are at a point in the negotiations, the Secretary continued, where a number of military and political issues have to be resolved. In putting the issues to the Israelis, we have succeeded in avoiding any new demands. The problem is more one of how to formulate arrangements. Moreover, as President Ford has already indicated, we will not consider a new interim agreement as anything more than a step toward the overall objective. In the political sphere, the questions are: a) How to formulate, and b) who conveys what to whom and how. In the military sphere, it is a matter of lines, locations and forces. The Secretary said he would like to settle as much as possible on this trip to the Middle East. Since the Israeli Cabinet meets on Sunday, he hoped to go to Damascus on Saturday, but the main principles will have to be settled on a trip to Israel. So far as the military issues are concerned, the Secretary recalled we had agreed on general lines in the north with
the addition of a few hundred meters to be obtained during the shuttle. In the south, there are a few more lines to be solved.

In connection with the exits to the passes, we cannot agree with where the Israelis propose to position their forward line in Gidi. In Mitla, it is harder to tell, since the terrain flattens more gradually. The Secretary doubted we can move them on both passes. He then showed Sadat aerial photos of Gidi and Mitla in which the forward and main Israeli lines were shown. The Gidi photo showed that the Israelis cannot be construed to be out of the Gidi pass. The Secretary thought, nevertheless, that something might be achievable. He had told Rabin that we cannot support that Israeli position. Rabin had said that we would, under pressure, be willing to go back to a point where the northern mountain face swings northward.

Gamasy observed that the Israeli forward line is about 500 meters in the Gidi Pass. The Secretary said that anything beyond what he had indicated would be difficult and time consuming. In Mitla, the Secretary showed the forward and main Israeli lines. Sadat asked if the Secretary discussed any compromise on these forward lines. The Secretary stated that they claimed their position at the exit of Gidi because it becomes flatter there. Our man (Hoskinson) states the exit can be put almost anywhere because of the flat nature of the terrain on one side of the road and the mountains on the other.

Sadat thought they wanted their position in Gidi to defend their crossroads at Bir-Hasanah. Gamasy observed that even if they do not budge, they will still be close to the eastern pass exit. He thought that in the case of Mitla, they would go back. The Secretary thought they would not do it in case of Mitla, but might be willing to do so in the case of Gidi. Gamasy stated that, militarily speaking, it makes no difference; the ground is generally flat.

Fahmy asked about Hoskinson's findings. The Secretary said that in Gidi the Israelis are not out. Hence, we cannot support them. In Mitla, it is more theoretical. Our man had shown a two-kilometer long strip which could, with some plausibility, be called the exit. Gamasy observed that any

SECRET NODIS CHEROKEE
two soldiers will agree on the location of the Gidi pass exit. In the case of Mitla, he acknowledged, there can be a difference. However, Egypt has always considered Nakhla as the exit. The Secretary said that our man indicated the earliest one could say Israelis are out of Gidi is one kilometer east of the present Israeli forward line.

Sadat stated that so long as they are out of the passes, it is all right with him. Fahmy pointed out they are not out of them. Sadat opined that if the American observer says they are not out of Gidi, the forward Israeli line should be moved. The Secretary speculated it might be moved back about one kilometer. Sadat thought it was very close -- perhaps 4 - 500 meters. Gamasy stated that with only 500 meters, the opposing sides are within rifle fire.

With respect to the monitoring stations, the Secretary noted that he has not told the Israelis Sadat will accept Israeli manning with American management. He had held that back. The same is true of the two American posts. The Israelis continue to insist upon six posts; President Ford is willing to have only two. Sensors might be put in the other four locations. Sadat asked if the Americans would be military or civilian. The Secretary stressed they would be civilians essentially unarmed and with no authority to fight. He opined they are required by Israeli domestic politics. Nevertheless, they are a mistake on the Israeli part. They offer no military protection. The personnel will have only pistols for their own protection against marauders. They will use these only in self-defense. We have consulted the Congress on this subject. Golda Meir is opposed to them because they will start a debate in the US about relations with Israel. The Israelis have enough power in the Congress. We will face a vote in the Congress that will begin a debate on these questions. We will have to give many assurances.

The Secretary noted his view that the posts are the Israeli way of bringing Peres along. Dayan is opposed to them. Fahmy inquired what if Congress turns them down. The Secretary opined that Congress will not turn them down. Fahmy asked if we could not arrange this in the context of Congressional consultations. The Secretary replied in the negative. He noted that if we agree on a draft agreement, it will be initialed. Then it will go to Geneva to work out some technical details. This will require a week or so. He
thought we could get an agreement through the Congress before those discussions are finished. Rabin's plan, the Secretary noted, is to submit the agreement to the Knesset and to the Central Committee of the Labor Party. After it is approved there, technical discussions can begin. We then put it to the Congress. This might take about ten days time. The Secretary emphasized that only the US presence aspect will be presented to the Congress. It will involve about 15-20 men at each post. Radars will also have to be put in. The Secretary had publicly stated that the personnel will be volunteers, unarmed except for sidearms, and be technicians working for both sides. They will provide information to both sides. At Gidi they will also check on Israeli personnel going to the station. Altogether a total of about 100-150 will be needed. The Secretary said we are unenthusiastic about the idea. We have, nevertheless, talked to about 30 Congressional leaders. They, too, will vote for it without any enthusiasm. Sadat mused that only Peres is enthusiastic about the posts. The Secretary commented that, symbolically speaking, no one needs the posts. From a political point of view, too, no one needs the posts. He thought they would turn into a military liability for Israel. The little information they pick up is likely to be more useful to Egypt than Israel. Sadat asked if the information would be given to both sides and also to UNEF. The Secretary said yes.

Fahmy inquired to what extent the agreement is dependent upon this. The Secretary responded that, in his view, it is absolutely imperative. He recalled the Israelis still want six stations. For them it would be easier with three than with two. If they give a few hundred more yards, he might recommend this. Rabin, the Secretary reiterated, does not really want the posts. Dayan needs something he contributed. In the Secretary's view, the posts are not in the Israeli interest and he thought he might talk to the Israeli Cabinet about it. There have been numerous editorials in the US against such posts. Nevertheless, the Secretary was confident they would ultimately be approved. After some discussion among the Egyptians in Arabic as to the military and political significance of the posts, the Secretary stated that he had had no discussions with the Israelis about Sadat's pertinent view. He thought he might do so the next time.
Fahmy alluded to the access corridor, noting it will be Egyptian. In the road area, the UN might be present. The Secretary stated that it would be under Egyptian civilian administration but under general UN supervision. He wondered how this might be worked out. Gamasy proposed that the UNEF forces might be along the eastern line of the corridor. Fahmy pointed out that there are problems with this concept. For example, how can the UN supervise. Egypt will give in writing the commitment that there will be no military forces in the corridor. The Secretary reiterated his question how this will be supervised. Fahmy stated Egypt will give its word. There will be no more than a few frontier guards to deter smugglers, since this is a smuggling area.

The Secretary said that the Israelis claim Egypt has 20,000 men in Sinai. Gamasy stoutly denied this. The Israelis had made the charge to Sillasvuo, who had approached him. He had denied it to Sillasvuo and invited the latter to look for himself. Sadat observed that if the Israelis have some suspicions, they could contact the UN.

The Secretary stated that our impression had been that the corridor would have Egyptian civilian administration, but with a UN presence. Sadat repeated that if the Israelis have a complaint, the UN could come. Gamasy pointed out that UNEF will use the roads through the corridors. From there, they could see for themselves. The Ambassador noted that there could be UN checkpoints on the road. Sadat agreed checkpoints could be on the roads, but insisted they should not be off of the roads. The Secretary thought that there must certainly be UN checkpoints on the roads. Such other UN posts as may be needed could await later discussions. Sadat agreed. The Secretary said we had not discussed this with the Israelis. Fahmy cautioned that if the Israelis have co-administration in mind, Egypt cannot accept. The Secretary thought they do not contemplate co-administration but they will probably want some forces in the corridor. Gamasy pointed out on the map that Egypt will have to use a portion of the Israeli road and the Israelis will have to use a portion of the Egyptian road. This will require three UN checkpoints. The Secretary indicated one should also be in the north at the entrance of the corridor. Gamasy reiterated the Israelis can see and check the Egyptians from the roads. The Secretary again stated we had not discussed this with the Israelis. Sadat echoed the idea that there can be no co-administration.
Fahmy observed that the terminology, "civilian administration" had confused them. This was not foreign territory, it was Egyptian. Sadat asserted that it can be said there will be no Egyptian military forces in the area. The Secretary asked how the UN operates in the buffer zone. Gamasy replied that that zone is completely under the UN. Spot checks are made once or twice a week and on any day. The Secretary said he had not yet heard the Israeli point of view on how this should work. He personally thought that the duties described for the UN in the corridor makes sense. UNEF would have to have some checkpoints and the right to go anywhere. It should be under Egyptian civilian administration with UN rights defined. The function of the UN should not be to administer, but to supervise the agreement. Fahmy interjected that for this reason, it could not be called "under Egyptian civilian administration." In answer to the Secretary's query what it should be called, Sadat suggested simply, "the corridor." Under Secretary Sisco observed this is going to create problems in Israel. The Secretary pointed out that the Israelis say this will be a UN zone under Egyptian civilian administration. Fahmy reiterated that Egypt cannot accept calling a part of Egyptian territory "under Egyptian civilian administration." Egypt is ready to say it will not introduce military forces and agrees to UN checkpoints. The Secretary noted that Egypt agrees to checkpoints and UN inspection to check if there are forces there. It should be possible in some way to write the agreement in some way to accept this.

With respect to the road, Fahmy said Egypt agrees to it and the Israelis should agree how they use it. It must be written in the agreement that the use of the road is temporary. He recognized that it might take a long time to construct another road, but it was important to have this specific statement. The Secretary agreed. He asked if the Egyptians understand that the Israelis will have military traffic on the road. Fahmy said this is a problem. The Secretary noted that this will only be on days when the Israelis have a right to use it. Fahmy wanted to know what if they attack people who are there. The mechanics, he thought, could be worked out by the military. The President, he pointed out, prefers that we say only that this is a temporary arrangement without mentioning there will be another road. The military men at Geneva can work it out.
Sadat inquired if the Umm Khushaib really costs $100 million as has been publicized. The Secretary opined that it was probably more than that. He noted we do not have enough technical personnel to man the stations. We are willing to give some of this type of equipment to Egypt if it is wanted. He asked whether the Egyptians want the station. Gamasy pointed to a place on the map (near Gidi), but noted this would require the use of the Gidi road. The Secretary said that it cannot be on an east-west road. The Israelis suspect Gamasy. Gamasy reiterated that his first preference would be near the Gidi Road, but this is too close to the Israeli forward line. His second preference would be somewhere on the Ismailia road. The Secretary asked if there is anything near Mitla that could be used and recalled that the Egyptian station will technically be under American management. Politically, this makes it more explicable. Fahmy suggested it be put in Gidi so that the American posts there can check both. We should not say there are two American posts. We should say there are extensions of Umm Khushaib management.

Reverting to the location of the Egyptian station, Gamasy noted that, electronically, the Gidi area is best. The second priority is on the Ismailia road area and the north is a third priority. The Secretary wanted to know how he should answer the suggestion that the Egyptians cannot see anything there. Gamasy pointed out there is a hill in the area. Although not as high as Umm Khushaib, it offers coverage. The Secretary said the Egyptian station should be one or kilometers off the road. The President agreed. Gamasy also agreed, but noted it must be on a high hill. He undertook to study the maps and provide us with coordinates. (He did so the following day.)

The Secretary said the Israelis will have 200 men in Umm Khushaib and the Egyptians can have the same. There will be a few, unarmed Americans to supervise. Fahmy argued that the Egyptian station should have no American management; instead, it should be under the UN. The Secretary thought the Israelis will not agree. They want exact symmetry. Fahmy noted he was thinking about the reaction of Israeli radicals. They will say there are two American bases and four American bases. The Israelis should have confidence in the UN. The Secretary said they do not. Gamasy said the posts will only be doing surveillance.
The Secretary said we had begun with two American monitoring stations in the zone. This had developed into two American managed stations, one mainly with Israel and one with Egypt. Fahmy recalled this had been discussed at Salzburg. The Secretary said there were two reasons for the changes: a) Intelligence data are by their nature confusing. If foreigners interpret them, they receive the criticism if something goes wrong. This is especially true with strategic intelligence. For example, had we been operating the stations before October 6, we would have been accused. We think it better, therefore, that the evaluation be by those to whom it is of greatest concern. b) We do not have enough Americans to man the station. The Secretary again asked Gamasy if he is against the position near Gidi. Gamasy responded affirmatively, noting it is only about 100 meters from the Israeli forward line. As a precise location is sought, the Egyptians might even find themselves in Israeli lines. "The troops will be sleeping day and night with each other," he said.

The Secretary agreed and asked that the coordinates be given to us. He would see what the Israelis say. He agreed that we will give Egypt technical advice and equipment, if it is needed. Sadat said Egypt wants exactly the same kind of equipment that Israel has. Fahmy noted that this would be psychologically good for the army. The Secretary said we will have to send experts to discuss the subject. He was not acquainted with exactly what kind of equipment was there. Sadat said he also wanted our advice in connection with what is built at the station. The Secretary agreed in principle. The Israelis will say the Egyptian station is ahead of their line. We will recommend this and see what happens.

Alluding to the Egyptian forward line, the Secretary noted he had urged the President to ask for four kilometers. The Secretary inquired where Sadat wished him to put the biggest effort? Or should he insist on everything and see what happens? He thought the Israelis will pay a lot for not having to move the UN line. He had said he would try to get one or two kilometers. This has become a major point of issue, domestically, for them.

Rabin had said privately that, if Sadat agrees that Umm Khushaib remains within the Israeli line, then he could
give a five kilometer bulge on the Egyptian forward line. However, Egypt would not then have a station. Conversely, if Egypt accepts the proposed line (with a few changes), he would be willing to pay more on the other line and Gidi. Sadat said that not moving from the Egyptian line to the present UN line is OK, but asked the Secretary to get a price for this. Gamasy pointed out there should be some forward movement in the north. As it now stands, the Israelis can bombard Port Said. The President reiterated it was all right, but we should get a price for this. Along the northern line, some change should be gotten. Fahmy said that if Umm Khushaib remains in Israel, Egypt also wants a monitoring station. The Secretary noted that if the present Beta Line moves forward, the Israelis would expect that any station would by Egyptian in UNEF territory. If we do not go beyond the present UN line, there is a high probability of getting the station, some further movement in Gidi and some 100 yards in the north. He also noted that the Israelis could fortify Umm Khushaib if it were turned over to them. Vice President Mobarek stated it is better to keep Umm Khushaib in the buffer zone. Sadat agreed. Gamasy again asked that something be gotten in the north, and Sadat requested the Secretary to try to do so.

Fahmy noted this area is important because of fishing. Egyptian fishermen should be allowed to fish in the buffer zone. The Secretary asked what restrictions there are, and Fahmy replied the Israelis are getting a great number of fish out of the Bardawil. Gamasy noted this is also necessary for security. The President reiterated he agreed with the UN Beta line, but the Secretary should get some price. The Secretary asked what price? The General said try to get them out of the passes. Fahmy suggested the Secretary also try to get them out of the heights on both sides of the passes. The Secretary thought he could get some kind of a price if he plays it carefully. Otherwise they are likely to pocket this concession. He again asked what Egyptian priorities were.

Gamasy responded that the first priority should be getting the Israelis out of the passes, even if only 100 meters. If the US can say they are out, this will be helpful. The Secretary said that, in his judgment, if he raises both Gidi and Mitla, the reaction will be negative. It would be easier to concentrate on Gidi. Our geographer stated that it makes little difference at the Mitla pass. Gamasy agreed that Mitla makes little difference, but Gidi is important.
The Secretary asked if the Egyptians prefer movement in the north or south. Gamasy said he wanted it in both areas. In the yellow area, he would like the Israelis to go back to the old blue line. The Secretary said they would move only in the 100’s of meters. Gamasy observed that this is nothing. Fahmy suggested that the Secretary try to get two kilometers and four kilometers on the UN line. He recalled that the Secretary had already suggested that one or two kilometers could be gotten. The Secretary expressed concern that, if he tampers with the UN line, they will be difficult. If they can keep that line, they will be willing to pay something. He suggested that they be allowed to keep most of the line with a little straightening out in the north and in the bulge. If, on the other hand, the Egyptians want a major change on that line, they will get little along the yellow line and in Gidi. He again asked which the Egyptians want.

Sadat inquired if the salient in the UN line could be adjusted. The Secretary thought we could play with this idea. Fahmy suggested that something more be gotten in the north and in the yellow areas. The Secretary reiterated that if the Egyptians leave the UN line unchanged, they could bargain with this for other things. If Egyptians make minor changes in the UN line, we can still bargain. However, if they seek major changes in the UN line, they will get almost nothing elsewhere. After some discussion among the Egyptians, Sadat stated we should "sell the UN line to them." The Secretary said he would tell them the UN line is accepted, but will try to get a little in the north and in the bulge. His main effort will be in Gidi and in the yellow areas. Gamasy pointed out that any changes in the yellow areas will not affect their military position.

The Secretary observed that the Israelis are going through a difficult time. They will have to change. Sadat said that he wants the Israeli mentality to be changed. The Secretary then addressed himself to the political side of the problem. He said he understood the Egyptian reluctance to give anything in writing. The Israelis will certainly leak it. He proposed, therefore, that Egypt give us something in writing. We will give our word of honor that we would not show it to them. We will simply say we have assurances. Our President, if a campaign is mounted against him after the agreement, will at least be able to say it is based on some assurances. We never showed the Israelis the first disengagement letter. This would be just between the two of us.
The Secretary then recapitulated the Egyptian position on the access corridor -- fixed UN checkpoints and mobile patrols, Egyptian civil administration and no military forces.

President Sadat asked what about the political list? The Secretary stated there are three major issues: a) the boycott, b) hostile propaganda, and c) political warfare. He and the President would also then have to discuss non-use of force. If the US undertakes to give an assurance that Israel will not attack Syria, then Egypt will not intervene if Syria attacks Israel. Sadat responded, "This is horrible. It can be understood between us, but no more than that." (The Secretary later instructed the Ambassador to take up this issue again with Fahmy.)

The Secretary then asked about the other three issues he had mentioned. Sadat responded that, "They will bill the whole world; they have already done so." He recalled what he had done at Kampala and Lima (sic). The Secretary stressed that something along lines is necessary for an agreement. Fahmy commented that the President had made his position clear at Khartoum. The Israelis are not reasonable. There is no symmetry between a Syrian attack on Israel and an Israeli attack on Syria. After an agreement has been reached, he asked rhetorically, how can Syria attack Israel? The Israelis, on the other hand, can attack Syria. The Syrians and the Palestinians, Fahmy noted, are already accusing Egypt of fostering disunity and dividing the Arab world.

The Secretary asked about the boycott. Fahmy responded that Egypt will give us assurances and will start with Ford. This will be a "reasonable thing." The Secretary noted that the Israelis are making significant military moves under US pressure and ask what they are getting in exchange. Sadat commented that the US has given them much. The Secretary said they see what the US gives, but ask what Egypt gives. Fahmy commented that US aid is money, technical aid, arms, etc. The US is buying what Israel is doing. The Secretary again asked what can we say Egypt is giving. Fahmy responded that, for all practical purposes, Egypt is physically out of the war. The Secretary pointed out that this is as a result of the agreement; it is not a quid pro quo. Fahmy scoffed that the Israelis can hardly expect much from Egypt for this meager agreement.
The Secretary pointed out that this is a complicated matter. For Israel, it is a strategic retreat. Symbolically, it is a tremendous thing. The exact location of the line is not as crucial as the fact that Israel is going back peacefully. Fahmy observed that the Israelis are getting a formal Egyptian pledge not to resort to force and an annual UNEF renewal.

The Secretary proposed that, during his absence, the Ambassador talk further with the Minister on these political aspects. Fahmy agreed. (Subsequent discussions between Fahmy and the Ambassador are recorded in Alexandria 043, 044 and 063.)

Sadat urged that an effort be made to find something acceptable, but noted that the Arab world is strongly attacking him. The Soviets are also upset. The Secretary noted they need our grain.

The Secretary said he wished to refer to one other thing. The Israelis are determined to bring down President Ford and him. If we are to continue our strategy, Sadat must help us to keep the area quiet after an agreement. If it blows up, everything is finished. If it is quiet, we have the opportunity to make a real big move after 1976. He noted it is part of US policy to maintain the high reputation President Sadat has developed. It could lead to a great breakthrough. Sadat said we can be sure, although he noted that in the Arab world he will receive heavy bombardment. We could nevertheless rest assured. The Secretary said we will get some marginal changes for Syria, but it will not be much because of the Israeli settlements on Golan. We propose to begin this around October. Sadat asked if the Secretary would tell this to Asad. The Secretary said yes, but he could not give Asad any details. Sadat urged that the Secretary tell him as much as he could.

On the way to dinner, the Secretary told Fahmy that the Israelis would like to send cargo on a third country vessel through the Canal before their Knesset meeting. Fahmy agreed that this might be done, but asked that it not be so filled with cargo as to attract a great deal of attention.

AMB:HFrEilts:ajc - 8/25/75 (9/3/75)
DRAFT FOLLOWS
MEMCON

Kissinger: Last May we were determined to go for overall settlement; this after all is significant if though not ungenerous. It is a tremendous step, Israel goes back without settling the oil conflict; they return economical valuable territory. Rabin is trying to do the right thing in his own way. We should do our retreat, seize the opportunity, bring it to a rapid conclusion, even though not as satisfactory as we hope.

If we succeed, we would consider a Presidential invitation to come to America.

Sadat: I quite agree; I'm ready.

Kissinger: I want to make a general observation: Your basic strategy of '73 has proved successful, maybe more slowly then we had hoped due to America's domestic situation; it has been successful since in America it is now possible to pursue a relatively even-handed policy; since the March breakdown we adopted a policy of criticizing Israel; we maintained this; this is significant; if we succeed we will be getting Israeli withdrawal in peacetime.

We do not consider this as anything since this is a step toward a final settlement.

As to political issues, we have avoided new demands. The problem is how to formulate principles we have already agreed upon. Also who conveys what assurances to whom.

Second, we have the military issues to resolve: lives, zones, warning stations, etc. Hopefully get principles agreed to in my next trip to Israel; and finish rapidly next week.
- 2 -

Kissinger: Military issues first; (slowed both)

I think we have a problem in the Giddi Pass. On Mitla ________
out in more gradual way. We'll do hard to move them on both. I will
tell you what is achievable. Rabin is not willing to go 600 meters from
where the mountain turns north of the valley ________.

Gamasy: Giddi - the forward line is not out of the passes; the main line is.

Kissinger: Anything beyond this is going to be difficult.

Kissinger: Mitla Pass

Sadat: Any compromise on this line.

Kissinger: They claim flat.

Sadat: Their main point is they are defending the crossroads.

Gamasy: They are very close to passes; they can go there anytime.

Militarily speaking, they should move.

Kissinger: The report of our man is that in Giddi the military are out of
the passes; in Mitla it is more theoretical. Our geographer would put it
about 1 kilometer east on Giddi; Israells reluctant.

Gamasy: No. 2. Soldiers would disagree on Giddi; on Mitla can see why
there are differences.

Kissinger: Our man . . .

Sadat: As long as they are out of the passes, it is OK. It should be moved
in Giddi.

Sadat: Found line and main line awfully close in Giddi.

Kissinger: Warning stations - I have not told them you will agree to
area ports and Israel retain Un Korlobi; 4 ________, 2 ports, civilians,
no authority to fight. Two ports are in domestic politics; great Israeli mistake; we’ve consulted Congress; (Mew ag) ports because it will start a debate in America. Re relates that well within Israel. We’ll force a vote in Congress. We’ll have to give Congress many assurances.

Fahmy: Suppose Congress turns it down; it will hurt the agreement.

Kissinger: It’s in your interest; procedure is to initial agreement, go to Geneva, it will take a week or two; we can get it thru Congress before signature. Agree next Friday, Rabin will submit it to the Knesset; then we’ll start the technical discussions, we’ll put it before Congress and adopted in a week. We’ll put up some radar, ________, General Gamasy _____ it 15 or 20 men at each port, volunteers, unarmed, no military operations, technicians; give information to both sides; they are talking about 100, 150. We are enthusiastic about it. We called about 30 leaders; they will vote for it without enthusiasm. A net _______ for Israel politically.

Gamasy: Israelis can put up artillery for the Un Kula

Sadat: Information to both sides and UNEW. All right.

Kissinger: The Israelis are inserting on 6; they might reco 3 if they gave us a few hundred yards.

Inserting because American presence gives them reason to have passes. I thought I’d meet with Israeli Colonel to explain why it is not a good idea. It is a military ______ and a political liability in America for them.
No discussion re southern coastal road port.

Fahmy: Egypt _____, in area of road will be UN. NO forces.

Kissinger: Has he supervised the UN zone.

Fahmy: All we need are civilians; ad, health

Kissinger: UN presence;

? UN forces use the road; have checkpoints.
K: Some have to be UN checkpoints on the road, what other UN presence is needed.

F: Can't accept co-administration.

K: Don't have that in mind.

?: Gamsay 3 or 4 checkpoints; if any difficulty UN can check the zone.

S: No forces.

K: Duties you have described for UN for zone do not make sense; define duties; UN supervises -- no military. UN Zone -- council aid.

F: Can't allow. Call E ad of Egyptian administration of E land. UN checkpoints and no military forces, unilateral right? regulation of inspection; included regulation to check.

S: Temporary agreement in agreement. No mining of road.

S: Does UN cost 100 million?

K: Yes, same, it is a complicated settlement. Why give you some eq.

G: Our first preference is in the passes; our 100 meters from the line; middle axis.

K: How do I if you can't see the issue from the middle axis.

G: It is just a higher hill 1-2 kilometers off the Middle Axis road.
K: __________ -- 200 -- 200 ______ we will have a few people, 
to supervise the land station. Both stations are to be symetrical.

F: Let's move UN regiment of E station.

K: They won't agree.

F: Well say there are four American bases.

K: We deserved two American stations in zone; then it developed 
into 1 for 5 for Israel. Two reasons why we are dubious.

An intelligence station should be left to the parties.

G: Deccg, or passes will be close to their lines.

S: I want the same station, same technicians.

K: In principle we agree to help. Have to send some ______.

S: We want your advice also.

K: Beta line: urged you to _____ four kilometers. You tell 
me what you will provide. They would pay a lot for ______ ___.
____ kilometer has become a tremendous domestic issue. ___

Rabin road -- you won't accept, I believe -- you permit ___ 
around station give E a bulge in Bline.

F: Do a straight 5 ______.

K: He won't do it: if you accept Bline with 
some slight ______ he ______ for some or them our line of 
limitation.

S: ______ UN line o.k., get the price for this.
K: If Um ____ is in territory, station is in your territory.

F: Won't fishy ____ on Bush Weil -- in No.

S: I know pol specimen -- accepted this, what is the price? In Giddi. Premeter -- pushed out of ____________100 meters. We'll take your words.

K: ____ for us to ____ the Giddi.

S: Gamasy agrees.

G: I am interested in both book in SO' and NO'.

S: I want to get Israel to change its military.

K: On the political side, no details which is our problem.

I understand reluctance to give them .

Give us something to use. We want to show them to our President. ______ do if company ______, we can have it on certain assurances in NO.

Lines, and So.

Egyptian, without military forces. UN ____ authorized to check, mobile teams -- reports of violations .

S: What about political issues?

K: Three areas: boycott, proposals, political warfare.

If U.S. gives assurances Israel ______ Syria, Egypt won't intervene if Syria attacks Israel.
Mr. Gillette, Apr 27, 1925

1. The May day determination for one thing resulted in an awful piece of hypocrisy of the sort unpleasant. In the tremendous step, would you have expected the real conflict, quadratic relations, some semblance of reality? Robin was trying to do right thing in his own way, we all try to make the opportunity bring to expect containing elements not in subjectivity as we live.

You pressed, made the ambition to come to an

2. Endeavor the study.

3. Send me a good picture. How you have started of the lead.

4. Send me a good picture—maybe more than we have.

5. To publish again we had decided to accept,

6. Modal and the pictures that seem to be:

7. This is significant, of we succeed we

8. And I think the picture was.

9. Mr. Gillette:

10. Missing names must be added.

End of letter.

11. Would not come in any way to class if I could.

12. Would not come in any way to class if I could.

13. Would not come in any way to class if I could.

14. Would not come in any way to class if I could.

15. Would not come in any way to class if I could.

16. Would not come in any way to class if I could.
C. Pears -- formed from not out of the power.
main line in.

B. Cockeyed this guy was a different.

A. Mellow pain.
D. On a corner another line.

C. Key chloride.

H. Then man went the on. [unreadable]


F. [unreadable]

D. Again go close to power. Can go there anymore.

E. Making nearly they showed some.

C. Post of on money just a [unreadable] another okay.

A. Mellow once blended. As you're weight not about.

B. Chlorite last to [unreadable] another.
(3) Suppose dren game A our, and agree
(4) The people under quantum mutual agreement,
go to these line and use it. We can get
at the Congress for signature. Agree
and do this. Can we agree that?
the stock and the rest. We'll put the
Congress, adapt a.a week. We'll put
up some order. We now agree to limit it
is to me at the post, we have
some operations. We can get to let
order. Talk about 100, 150, 200 at least until
and it. Called about 30,000 will write for it
collect police. A will head for police
police.

(5) Suggest can pay this only for the other
(6) Up to both ends A 1424. All right
(7) Meanwhile we might see of the you
no a few hundred good.

(8) Egg, adj. mass 400 and cell be W,
no forget
(9) A be removed all here.
(10) see us and our Citizens; do, deel
(11) W. green;
(12) W. green, the said one
deparents.
(6) What about jet cans?

(7) Front, I boycotter, property jet unison.

(8) Possibly men in jet cans and jets

(9) if we give arms and at all

(10) Iran and extensive of Syria

(11) 3 times Israel.

(12) This is horrible. Can we conduct this letter as

(13) But not more than this, and well able

(14) until we puttunga, clearly done so

(15) People & time.

(16) We are needed to get again.

(17) France will you,

(18) She can & allow land even the agree.

(19) In time will consent, if the case, and damn

(20) Read the plans.

(21) English, leaving an of steady ends

(22) Legal your demands

(23) As boycott, it shut until forth.

(24) They are only a sign. in mid. master, what can we

(25) Your point. What has & contributed.

(26) We learnt what they are doing.

(27) What we doing.

(28) Ideally we cut out of the war

(29) And show it as a strategy for Israel

(30) I may one, hopefully a thunder than

(31) The food can't face and what went.
Sugar them a round dooon while she goes.
@ 
@ All right, let's back track - no.
@ I know for sure - except, what
@ the price? Of course, eventually -
@ pulled out of from 100 meters, take this
@ time, you asking.
@ Least for me to consider this idea.
@ Penny-wise, pound-foo.
@ I believe in both, 50 or no.
@ I want to get it to change its mind.

@ On this part with no details,
@ on a fortune. Would like to give them a reality
@ come was something to me. We can't
@ show them, this or that. Please do
@ if company study, make sure it
@ certain circumstances, no.

Dec 4 30

Egyptian culture and from the middle of
China, while change sits of modern
[Handwritten text with bullet points and notes. The content is not legible due to the quality of the image.]